BIRMINGHAM: The last week has left European leaders in little doubt that they will be mostly on their own when it comes to Ukraine.

On Tuesday (Feb 18), Russia and the United States concluded their first talks on the future of the country, in the absence of both Ukraine itself and Europe. And make no mistake, it will be a deal that looks, at least in the short term, more like a victory for Russian President Vladimir Putin.

These are worrying prospects to begin with - and a real nightmare scenario for Europe. The continent is ill-prepared to step up and into a future without a significant US security presence.

Since the end of World War II, America’s presence has kept allies in Europe safe via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - first from Soviet then Russian aggression. For these past 80 years, the bill for European security has mostly been footed by Washington - to the displeasure of US President Donald Trump.

BOOTS ON THE GROUND IN UKRAINE?

Three years into the largest land war on the continent since 1945, European defence spending - despite significant increases - is still dwarfed by America’s. The US committed over US$900 billion in 2024, while Germany is Europe’s largest defence spender with less than US$90 billion.

The story is similar when it comes to combat-ready forces. Poland has the largest standing army among EU member states with around 200,000 soldiers, only half of whom are land forces that would be critical for both providing peacekeepers to Ukraine and deterring a future Russian aggression against another European country.

Yet, Poland has already ruled out sending troops to Ukraine. Other EU countries, including Germany, Spain and Denmark, have been more circumspect about whether they would be willing to put boots on the ground in Ukraine.

By contrast, the clearest commitment so far to contribute ground forces to secure a ceasefire has come from outside the EU.

However, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has not yet given any details about the troops he is prepared to commit to Ukraine. And with the size of the British army now below 80,000 soldiers and reportedly fewer than 20,000 ready to deploy in combat, he will be hard-pressed to deploy them in significant numbers.

The necessity to step up and assume greater responsibility for its own security has been recognised by European leaders for some time now. Their increasing determination to do something about it was also evident at a meeting hastily arranged by French President Emmanuel Macron on Monday in Paris.

THE QUESTION OF EUROPE’S ABILITY TO ACT

Necessity and willingness to one side, Europe’s ability to act, however, remains in doubt.

The meeting in Paris, much like a joint statement last week by the so-called Weimar+ group (Germany, France, Poland, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, the EU’s diplomatic service and the European Commission) is indicative of how divided Europe is becoming over what course to chart between Russia and the US.

There is an emerging “coalition of the willing” who are determined to invest in the continent’s defences to deter Russia from future aggression and provide Ukraine with badly needed security guarantees. This coalition shapes up to be a mix of the Weimar+ group, those countries and institutions invited to the emergency meeting in Paris on Monday and NATO’s other Baltic member states.

Potentially, this is a formidable alliance. But as the debate over the commitment to ground forces already indicates, this coalition is far from a unitary force.

And even if they were, their ability to act fast and decisively is hampered by the financial constraints they face. Several countries are highly indebted, including France, Italy and Spain which have a government debt greater than its country’s gross domestic product.

Germany, on the other hand, has a debt brake in place that prevents the federal government from exceeding an annual borrowing limit of 0.35 per cent of GDP. While temporary emergency exemptions are possible (and were enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic), changing this permanently to enable sustained higher defence spending would require a constitutional amendment.

With many European countries domestically constrained to increase their military budgets, the alternative would be a new common European debt to finance the estimated €500 billion (US$522 billion) investment needed in the continent’s defence-industrial base over the next decade. Yet, common borrowing is anathema to many of the fiscally more conservative northern European members.

EUROPE NEEDS TO FIND A WAY

As the saying goes, where there is a will, there is a way. And Europe now more than ever needs to find a way.

The time for muddling through with temporary fixes to deep structural problems is well and truly over given that the ultimate US backstop to European security seems to be disappearing before our eyes.

A US-Russia deal on Ukraine is above all a deal on the future European security order. Kyiv and Brussels may not be in the room when Mr Putin and Mr Trump strike their bargain, but the more common strength they can muster, the less exposed they will be when that deal turns out to be nothing more than a prelude to Russia’s next aggression.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham and Head of the Department of Political Science and International Studies.